



INdIgENISINg Our apprOaCH 
TO ImmIgraTION
TaHu kukuTaI aNd 
arama raTa
In recent years, discontent with migration and 
migrants in the wealthy global north has manifested 
in disturbing ways: cue Brexit, xenophobia, border 
paranoia, far-right nationalism and its bedfellow 
white supremacy. On the surface, Aotearoa New 
Zealand appears to have escaped the uglier aspects 
of this nativism. Despite the grumblings of the New 
Zealand First Party, no serious popular or political 
anti-immigration movement has appeared, 
and racially motivated attacks against migrants 
are relatively rare. This is despite the fact that 
Aotearoa has a much higher relative foreign-born 
population share than the United States or United 
Kingdom,1 and ‘superdiverse’ Auckland – which 
comprises at least 40 per cent migrants – now 
has the ignominious claim to being the fourth-
least affordable city in the world, far outstripping 
London and New York.2
For some, the apparent absence of a strong anti-
immigration sentiment reflects an inherent fairness 
in this country’s cultural, political and social fabric. 
In this volume a number of contributors will put 
paid to this rosy image, revealing the ways in 
which policies fall short of delivering a fair deal 
for migrants, and particularly migrants of colour. 
Our chapter begins with a Māori perspective and 
reflects on where Māori, as tangata whenua, fit in 
contemporary migration policy and discourses.
Bridging the immigrant–indigenous divide is 
no easy task. In Aotearoa New Zealand, as in the 
other colonial settler societies, there is a yawning 
hole in policy making and research relating to 
immigration; that is, the exclusion of indigenous 
peoples and perspectives. The treatment of 
immigration and Māori affairs as entirely separate 
has effectively (and, we argue, deliberately) erased 
Māori from national conversations on immigration. 
The exception is when individual Māori vocally 
challenge the state’s approach to immigration. 
Then – as, for instance, Dame Tariana Turia and 
Professor Margaret Mutu learned – the response is 
often widespread vilification by mainstream media 
and politicians. 
We begin by putting immigration in Aotearoa 
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New Zealand in its colonial context. In settler 
societies such as ours, colonisation and 
immigration are deeply intertwined, but this fact 
is rarely acknowledged. We also consider who 
benefits from existing arrangements which insist 
upon the integration of ‘ideal’ migrants into an 
implicitly Eurocentric mainstream. We conclude 
by reflecting on how Māori–migrant relationships 
might be fruitfully reimagined through a Treaty-
based approach founded on rangatiratanga and 
manaakitanga, while also giving substance to the 
fullness of multiculturalism.
COlONIalISm aNd ImmIgraTION: NEvEr THE 
TwaIN SHall mEET? 
It hardly needs saying that Māori experiences 
with immigration have been fraught. The 
deleterious consequences of colonisation were 
far-reaching, involving the usurpation of Māori 
tino rangatiratanga (ultimate authority); the 
replacement of tikanga (Māori law, customs and 
values) with a system built on English common law; 
large-scale alienation of land including outright 
confiscation; and coercive policies of cultural 
assimilation. Māori had little time to adjust to 
their rapid conversion from sovereign majority to 
disempowered minority. 
The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi can be seen as this 
country’s first immigration policy, referring to the 
need to protect Māori ‘just Rights and Property’ 
given the ‘great number of Her Majesty’s Subjects 
who have already settled in New Zealand and the 
rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe 
and Australia which is still in progress . . .’3 Many 
iwi saw opportunities to benefit from migration. 
Waikato, Hauraki, Northland and East Coast iwi 
had vibrant trading and export relationships from 
at least the 1830s onwards, all of which depended 
on fostering relationships with tauiwi (foreigners). 
But the assumption was that mana motuhake 
would remain intact, buttressed by demographic 
dominance. In 1840 the ratio of Pākehā to Māori 
was about one to forty. By 1860 the groups had 
reached parity and after 1874 Māori were less 
than one-tenth of the national population.4 Māori 
demographic ‘swamping’ was largely driven by 
intensified migration from the United Kingdom, 
but also reflected increased Māori mortality as a 
consequence of exposure to introduced diseases. 
This history of colonisation is critical to 
contemporary discussions about immigration 
and continues to shape, in myriad ways, the New 
Zealand nation-state and those who call it home. 
Immigrants to Aotearoa New Zealand enter into 
a society that (like all other settler societies) is 
racialised and unequal, and in which too many 
Māori occupy the lower rungs. Compared to non-
indigenous New Zealanders, Māori lead shorter and 
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less healthy lives; are more likely to leave high school 
with little or no formal attainment; have poorer 
labour market outcomes; and experience higher 
rates of child abuse, suicide and incarceration. For 
some indicators, Māori outcomes resemble those of 
African Americans – a group with a unique history 
of slavery and racial exclusion. 
Less obvious than the negative impacts of 
colonisation are the privileges that it has afforded 
Pākehā New Zealanders, who live in a political, 
economic and social system that largely reflects 
their culture and values. This, in turn, has 
implications for how national identity, belonging 
and citizenship are represented to those seeking 
to make Aotearoa New Zealand home. Take, for 
example, the oath of allegiance, which requires 
new citizens to swear to be ‘faithful and bear true 
allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the 
Second, Her heirs and successors’. Although there 
is now an option to take the oath in te reo Māori, 
and some councils have the occasional marae-based 
citizenship ceremony, the substance of citizenship 
is wholly geared towards one Treaty partner. Take 
also a recent high-profile report on immigration 
which describes the New Zealand national identity 
and way of life as aspiring to ‘meritocracy, freedom 
of association and speech, and equality before 
the law’.5 Such a whitewashed understanding 
of national identity would be laughable, were it 
not so deeply ingrained. Nominal biculturalism 
and demographic multiculturalism aside, the 
‘mainstream’ into which migrants are expected 
to integrate remains, at its core, a fundamentally 
Pākehā one. 
Given all of this it is unsurprising that 
Māori are uneasy about rising immigration. 
This unease reflects a number of concerns: the 
inevitability of losing ‘majority minority’ status 
as Māori population growth fails to keep pace 
with Asian net migration;6 the implications of 
this demographic shift for Māori political power; 
perceived competition for jobs and cultural 
resources; and uncertainty over the status of the 
Treaty and biculturalism. These concerns are 
easily misinterpreted as xenophobia or racism 
when decoupled from contemporary structural 
inequalities and the wider colonial context. 
Memories of displacement and domination are 
not relegated to the past; for many Māori they are 
real and raw. Tensions are further exacerbated by 
populist politicians and unbalanced media reports 
that pit Māori against migrants, and particularly 
against Asians. Such was the case with a national 
media report trumpeting that Māori ‘dislike Asian 
immigrants more than any other group of New 
Zealanders’, and that ‘Asians are blamed for taking 
jobs from Maori, driving Maori to Australia, lacking 
understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi and 
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competing for cultural funding’.7 The evidence? A 
nationally unrepresentative survey which included 
only a hundred Māori participants, and which 
showed that Māori were much more likely to say 
that New Zealanders felt less warm towards people 
from Asia compared with twelve months earlier.8 
The separation of Māori and migrants is also 
enabled by the very different mainstream articu-
lations of how each contributes to the collective 
national good. Māori still tend to be framed as a 
drain on the nation, with the goal of ‘development’ 
being to ‘bring Māori up’ to an implicit Pākehā stan-
dard. A genuine commitment to tackling structural 
inequalities is, of course, a desirable policy goal. 
However, all too often narratives about Māori are 
filtered through a deficit lens, which situates poor 
Māori outcomes as the result of ‘bad’ individual 
behaviours, choices or preferences. This deficit 
approach is a stark contrast to immigration pol-
icy which situates migrants as a national resource 
whose human capital can contribute to a ‘modern’ 
market economy. Indeed, one of the ways in which 
governments have been able to ignore Māori aspi-
rations to influence immigration is to construct 
dominant narratives around the role of immigra-
tion as essential for economic growth and global 
competitiveness – something that lies beyond the 
ambit of Māori development. We give these claims 
closer attention below.
INTEgraTION INTO a EurOCENTrIC 
‘maINSTrEam’
Much has been written about how New Zealand’s 
immigration policy served settler colonialism 
by keeping migrants white. Until the mid-1970s, 
entry was readily granted to citizens of Britain 
and Ireland, as traditional source countries. The 
place of Aotearoa New Zealand in the Pacific, and 
the connections of Māori to other Pacific peoples, 
were largely ignored. People from some Polynesian 
island states were granted citizenship or entry as 
temporary migrant workers to fill labour shortages, 
but when economic conditions changed and they 
were no longer needed, so-called ‘overstayers’ were 
targeted for deportation as part of the infamous 
‘dawn raids’. 
From the late 1980s onwards, the government 
embarked on a series of reforms designed to 
maximise the economic contribution of migration 
while dismantling the more overt aspects of racial 
preference. Preferential entry by nation was 
replaced first by a system aimed at filling specific skill 
shortages, then by a points system in 1991. While, 
in theory, the points system did not discriminate 
by race, it included English-language criteria that 
fluctuated according to political whim.9 In the mid-
1990s an ‘English language bond’ of $20,000 was 
introduced, reminiscent of the notorious poll tax 
imposed on Chinese migrants in the 1880s. These 
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language stipulations were justified as necessary 
to ensure social cohesion. Unsurprisingly, no 
points were allocated for proficiency in our other 
official languages: te reo Māori or New Zealand 
Sign Language. Racial criteria may have been 
expunged from immigration policy but the spectre 
of race continues to shape what ‘successful’ 
integration entails. 
While social cohesion was espoused as an 
important immigration goal, more recent policy 
shows that the ideal immigrant need not fit in if 
the government can cash in on their presence here. 
Migrant categories were introduced in 2009 that 
allowed investors residency without requiring 
that they actually live or work in Aotearoa. A 
range of temporary workers’ permits have also 
been introduced over time. In the case of both 
investors and temporary workers, the goal is not 
so much for these migrants to integrate as it is for 
them to contribute to the New Zealand economy. 
Rachel Simon-Kumar’s insightful analysis of racial 
politics and migration policy deftly shows how the 
desirable migrant is now constructed as someone 
who shares similarities in global, consumptive 
‘culture’, regardless of race.10
ECONOmIC BENEFITS FOr wHOm?
Given the emphasis that current immigration policy 
places on economic benefit, it is only fair to ask: 
who reaps the benefits? Immigration to Aotearoa 
New Zealand tends to increase productivity and 
gross domestic product per capita.11 The average 
contribution of immigrants to the New Zealand 
economy far exceeds that of New Zealand-born 
citizens, in part because a much higher proportion 
of the latter are at post-retirement age. However, 
the negative economic impacts of population 
growth, including growth through immigration, 
disproportionately affect Māori.
For much of the last twenty years, natural 
increase (the excess of births over deaths) has 
been the major contributor to population growth. 
However, since 2013 net migration has exceeded 
natural increase by a significant margin.12 Some of 
this is due to returning New Zealanders, but the 
majority of net migration comprises the overseas-
born. Population growth will inevitably put 
additional pressures on infrastructure. Historically, 
where new infrastructure has been required, it 
has often come at the expense of Māori property 
rights. This is not only a feature of our colonial 
past, but also of our present. The Public Works 
Act 1981 is one instrument the state continues to 
use excessively to alienate Māori land. Recently, 
the Act was used in an attempt to confiscate the 
culturally significant lands of nationally revered 
author Patricia Grace and her whānau for highway 
construction. The Grace whānau successfully 
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challenged the confiscation. However, their legal 
victory only pushed development on to lands of 
neighbouring whānau within Te Ātiawa. The Grace 
whānau saw this as no victory and are now working 
with Green Party MP Catherine Delahunty in 
support of her member’s bill to protect Māori land 
(both freehold and customary) from alienation 
under the Public Works Act, which is currently 
being deliberated on in select committee. The 
intention here is not to suggest that immigration 
leads directly to Māori land alienation, but to 
ensure that Māori interests are protected as we 
accommodate a growing population. Preventing 
Māori land from confiscation through the Public 
Works Act is an important step towards that goal.
In addition to stress on public infrastructure, 
migration-driven population growth also puts 
pressure on housing markets. While immigration 
alone has not caused New Zealand’s current 
housing crisis, it certainly adds to housing demand. 
Housing supply shortages have grossly inflated 
house prices, particularly in Auckland, where 
the median house price exceeds $1 million, with 
Queenstown not far behind. Increases in house 
prices might benefit existing homeowners, but at 
the pointy end of the housing crisis, where many 
Māori live, it is becoming increasingly common for 
households to spend more than half of their income 
meeting housing costs, as workers’ earnings trail 
behind rising accommodation costs. As inequality 
increases, many Māori find themselves severely 
housing-deprived, in temporary or inadequate 
housing, or homeless. 
While Māori suffer from housing deprivation, 
initiatives to increase housing supply are not always 
beneficial to Māori. Where Māori are included, 
housing initiatives can work well. For example, 
Ngāti Whātua recently signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the government to develop 400 
homes in Hobsonville Point. However, where Māori 
interests are ignored, housing initiatives can be 
detrimental to Māori. Lands at Ihumātao, Māngere, 
have been targeted by Fletcher Residential for a 
housing development, despite concerns being 
raised by the mana whenua, Te Wai-o-Hua, that 
the development would have a catastrophic impact 
on the neighbouring Māori heritage site of national 
significance, and would lead to gentrification of the 
nearby 800-year-old papa kāinga (settlement). An 
occupation/reclamation of the contested land by 
members of the local Māori community began on 
5 November 2016 and is ongoing at the time of 
writing. The protectors of Ihumātao are concerned 
that the housing crisis is being used as an excuse to 
pass legislation (the Housing Accords and Special 
Housing Act 2013) that allows the government to 
subvert Māori Treaty rights to be part of decision-
making processes, rights which are affirmed in 
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the Resource Management Act and the Local 
Government Act.
The impact of immigration on labour markets 
is also disproportionately detrimental to Māori. 
Immigration is great for business owners, as the 
flow of labour allows skills shortages to be met, 
and competition within the labour market lowers 
wages. The effect of immigration on wages is usually 
small and short-lived. However, given the lenient 
visa criteria for temporary migrants in a range 
of categories, coupled with the flow of returning 
expatriates escaping the stagnating Australian 
economy, the labour market is potentially saturated 
with low-skilled workers, causing concerns 
within Māori communities that low-skilled jobs 
will become more difficult to secure and less well 
remunerated.
Tensions in this space are not helped by claims 
that migrant workers are required because local 
workers are unwilling to fill jobs or are unable to 
pass drug tests, despite Work and Income’s drug-
screening programme yielding negligible positive 
results. Rather than setting Māori and migrants 
against each other for these jobs, complementary 
strategies are needed that provide opportunities 
to temporary migrants and enable iwi to partner 
with businesses to meet labour shortages by 
removing barriers to labour-force participation 
such as transport and accommodation shortages. 
In addition, there is a need to ensure that the 
‘floor’ in how low wages are able to fall is set at a 
level that enables workers’ needs to be met. And as 
migrant workers may be vulnerable to exploitation, 
businesses that use temporary migrant labour 
should be placed under closer scrutiny.
There are ample opportunities to create 
partnerships that are mutually beneficial for 
Māori and migrants. Many Māori businesses 
have a strong international presence, and larger 
iwi organisations are at a stage in their economic 
development to be looking internationally for 
investment opportunities. The Taniwha Dragon 
Economic Summit that took place in February 
2017 was a significant example of engagement 
between Māori and overseas economies. There is 
scope to provide positive incentives for migrant 
investors to invest in industries in which Māori are 
involved, and for iwi to take a more substantial role 
in influencing migration policies that are meant to 
benefit the regions. In regions that are struggling 
to deal with demographic and economic decline, 
iwi leadership is critical, and this ought to extend 
to matters involving immigration. Big business 
already has substantial influence over policy and 
public opinion. The New Zealand Initiative, which 
is sponsored by major New Zealand corporations, 
recently commissioned a report entitled The New 
New Zealanders: Why Migrants Make Good Kiwis, 
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which received a good deal of press. Among the 
report’s recommendations is preferential entry 
to citizens of English-speaking, white-majority 
nations via the awarding of additional points.13 
Providing for a much greater measure of Māori 
influence on migration policy is long overdue.
a TrEaTy-BaSEd mOdEl OF maNaakITaNga 
While a key theme animating this collection is the 
concept of ‘fairness’ as it relates to immigration, we 
return to tikanga as first law of the land, and reflect 
on what might be considered ‘tika’ – that is, right, 
just, fair or proper. What might a ‘tika’ approach 
to immigration look like – one that recognises 
the unique status and rights of Māori as tangata 
whenua, but also gives substance to the fullness of 
multiculturalism? 
Manaakitanga is a core Māori value that can be 
defined as ‘the process of showing and receiving 
care, respect, kindness and hospitality’.14 It is often 
used in reference to the hosting responsibilities 
of mana whenua (local authorities) when met 
with visitors, but also extends to care that is taken 
to manage and protect resources. The root of 
manaakitanga is mana (power, prestige, authority); 
‘aki’ indicates reciprocal action (the suffix ‘tanga’ is 
added simply to nominalise the verb manaaki). The 
concept of manaakitanga, then, captures notions 
of mutual care and respect for people, honouring 
one another or power sharing, and the protection 
of our environments. For this reason manaakitanga 
provides a useful framework when envisaging a tika 
system for immigration.
A system based on manaakitanga would still 
address economic imperatives, as the mutual 
benefits – economic or otherwise – for immigrants 
and the nation would continue to be a key feature. 
However, a system underpinned by care and 
respect would go further in accommodating 
new migrants once they arrived, for example by 
easing the difficulties currently faced in obtaining 
family reunification visas. Such a system would 
also need to reflect our responsibilities to care 
for our neighbours across Te Moana Nui a Kiwa 
(the Pacific Ocean), a greater recognition of our 
whakapapa relationships, and the shifting needs 
of international communities. This country’s 
embarrassingly small refugee quota in the face 
of a major global refugee crisis, and our failure 
to recognise the plight of climate refugees, could 
not be tolerated within a system where care and 
respect are central. These concerns would need 
to be balanced against our responsibilities to 
care for existing communities within Aotearoa 
(including Māori communities) and to protect our 
environments.
Inherent in a manaakitanga system would be 
the recognition of mana whenua,15 not simply as 
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a historical footnote, but as genuine authorities 
with ongoing rights to self-determination and 
important contributors to the contemporary 
cultural fabric of Aotearoa. Recognition of mana 
whenua requires more than just window dressing 
in the form of a pōwhiri for new migrants. Having 
new citizens make an oath to both Treaty partners 
(rather than just the Crown) by pledging to uphold 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi would be a small step towards 
this recognition of mana whenua. 
Māori take hosting responsibilities seriously. 
But there can be no manaakitanga without mana. 
Most if not all Māori authorities find themselves 
in situations where many of their lands, waterways 
and other resources have been alienated and 
their authority undermined by the Crown. 
Without resources and authority it becomes very 
challenging for Māori to take care of their own, 
and others. Despite these challenges, Māori groups 
throughout the country often go out of their way 
to take care of others, with many marae routinely 
opening their doors to accommodate people in 
the face of natural disasters and accommodation 
shortages. Recognising mana whenua would 
allow this manaakitanga to be extended further. 
For migrants, this model of a ‘host’ society 
would not require integration into a Eurocentric 
mainstream. Respect for Māori culture does not 
require the suppression of others’ cultures, nor 
their reduction to consumptive forms such as 
ethnic festivals. 
In this chapter we have advocated for the right 
of Māori to be included in immigration decision-
making. However, inclusion in these decisions 
would be a very limited form of recognition of the 
tino rangatiratanga (self-determination) promised 
in the Treaty. Only when tino rangatiratanga 
is realised will Māori be in a position to fully 
express manaakitanga to manuhiri (guests). It is 
important to note that manaakitanga goes both 
ways; there are behavioural expectations placed 
on both tangata whenua and manuhiri. While 
our history proves that these expectations of care 
and respect have been grossly violated, there are 
now processes in place to address breaches of Te 
Tiriti o Waitangi, and tauiwi have an opportunity 
to reciprocate manaakitanga by supporting Māori 
in their efforts to gain recognition and redress for 
Treaty breaches, and to realise tino rangatiratanga. 
Asians Supporting Tino Rangatiratanga and Racial 
Equity Aotearoa (founded by Māori) are examples 
of activist groups refusing to be divided and 
supporting each other’s political agendas.
So how might tino rangatiratanga be realised? 
Short of constitutional transformation, this 
would be difficult. A February 2016 report by 
Matike Mai Aotearoa, an independent iwi group 
working on ‘constitutional transformation’, 
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outlines constitutional arrangements that could 
better effect Te Tiriti o Waitangi, including a ‘three 
sphere’ model, with separate spheres for tangata 
whenua and tangata tauiwi decision-making and 
a relational sphere for joint decision-making. The 
vision of Matike Mai is to achieve constitutional 
change by 2040. 
Māori and newer migrants have the opportunity 
to work together to create constitutional 
arrangements that are better suited to our diverse 
citizenry. During our own migration story, our 
ancestors were able to navigate to these shores 
due in no small part to their strength of vision. Our 
navigators were able to see the distant islands of 
Aotearoa and pull them forth. This same ability to 
see beyond the horizon will enable us pull forth a 
new constitution for this nation. The waka has been 
carved, and provisions are being loaded. Current 
political tides, treacherous though they may be, will 
not keep us from our destination: a fair, diverse and 
inclusive Aotearoa. Will you join us?
